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JUDGE HAND'S VIEWS ON THE FREE SPEECH PROBLEM
ROBERT S. LANCASTER*
Judge Learned Hand has been for many years a lawyer's lawyer.
His opinions are liberally sprinkled through the case books; com-
mentaries on legal matters cite his opinions with increasing respect
and admiration; but to many people he is the judge who upheld the
conviction of the eleven communists in New York on a question in-
volving the limits of free speech. Scholars of parts and even some
lawyers do not know that he anticipated the Supreme Court's "clear
and present danger" test by two years, or that his contribution to the
law of free speech is by no means confined to his holding in the com-
munist conspiracy case. Judge Hand has dealt with many aspects of
this difficult and controversial problem. His early opinions were liberal
but restrained; his later opinions applied the law as he understood it to
operate within an industrial- context; his final opinion distilled from
long experience and a mature philosophy of law is now the law of
the land. It fulfilled his early promise and exemplified his greatest
gift and in the final analysis the object lesson of his judicial career-
judges must compromise and balance contending interests, even as
legislatures whose surrogates they are, but in so doing they must take
heed of the social values underlying legal principles and weigh.against
each other interests of similar kind, pitting social interest against
social interest and individual interest against individual interest
to the end that justice shall flourish and the law be vindicated.
THE DIRECT INCITEMENT TEST
On July 24, 1917, Learned Hand, Judge of the United States District
Court for the Southern District of the State of New York delivered
an opinion in the case of Masses Publishing Co. v. Patten,' which is
still quoted with approval by both Supreme Court justices and publi-
cists of reputation and distinction.2 In this case Judge Hand was asked
to enjoin the Postmaster of the City of New York from excluding from
the mails a monthly revolutionary journal called The Masses which,
it was contended, hampered the government in its conduct of the war
with Germany then raging and encouraged the enemies of the United
States. The August 1917 issue of that journal contained articles ex-
horting conscientious objectors to resist the draft by sticking it out to
* Professor of Political Science and Dean of Men, The University of the
South, Sewanee, Tennessee.
1. 244 Fed. 535 (S.D.N.Y. 1917).
2. See Justice Robert Jackson's opinion in Dennis v. United States, 341
U.S. 494, 568 (1951).
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the bitter end, extolling the virtues of those who were resisting con-
scription, and paying glowing and poetic tribute to Emma Goldman
and Alexander Berkman, two incendiary publicists, who were at the
time in prison for encouraging in their paper, Mother Earth, refusal
to register for the draft. The August issue of The Masses also con-
tained four cartoons generally lampooning the draft law and appealing
in rather inflammatory fashion to the spirit of resistance.
On June 15, 1917, the Espionage Act had become the law of the land
after several months of preparation and discussion by the Department
of Justice and Congress. Title I, Section 3 of the Act3 made it unlawful
to make willfully or convey false statements with the intent to inter-
fere with the operation or success of the military effort of the nation,
or to cause or attempt to cause insubordination in the armed forces,
or to obstruct willfully the recruiting or enlistment services of the
United States. Title XII, Section 1, excluded from the mails any matter
violative of any section of the Act, and made it the duty of the Post-
master-General to determine what matter was non-mailable. Pur-
suant to instructions from the Postmaster-General, the Postmaster of
the City of New York had excluded the August issue of The Masses
from the mails.
Judge Hand, after carefully rejecting any inquiry into the war
powers of Congress as irrelevant to the issues to be decided, concluded
that the language of the statute should not be construed to cover the
case at bar. While he admitted that the tendency of the publication
was to interfere with the war effort, he concluded that a distinction
had to be drawn, nevertheless, between mere advocacy which is in-
direct incitement and advocacy which is direct in character and
amounts to counseling disobedience of law. In this case Judge Hand
refused to apply what later came to be known as the "bad tendency
test" and instead framed another, at once both more liberal and more
explicit and more easily administered. Wrote Hand:
To counsel or advise a man to an act is to urge upon him either that if
is his interest or his duty to do it. While, of course, this may be accom-
plished as well by indirection as expressly, since words carry the
meaning they impart, the definition is exhaustive, I think, and I shall use
it. Political agitation, by the passions it arouses or the convictions it
engenders, may in fact stimulate men to the violation of the law. Detesta-
tion of existing policies is easily transformed into forcible resistance of
the authority which puts them into execution, and it would be folly
to disregard the causal relation between the two. Yet to assimilate
agitation, legitimate as such, with direct incitement to violent resistance,
is to disregard the tolerance of all methods of political agitation which
in normal times is a safeguard of free government. The distinction is
not a scholastic subterfuge, but a hard-bought acquisition in the fight
3. Act of June 15, 1917, c. 30, § 3, 40 STAT. 219.
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for freedom, and the purpose to disregard it must be evident 'when the
power exists. If one stops short of urging upon others that it is their
duty or their interest to resist the law, it seems to me that one should
not be held to have attempted to cause its violation. If that be not the
test, I can see no escape from the conclusion that under this section every
political agitation which can be shown to be apt to create a seditious
temper is illegal. I am confident that by such language Congress had no
such revolutionary purpose in view.4 (Emphasis added.)
In the same paragraph Judge Hand recognized that there must be
a point beyond which agitation must not be permitted to trespass:
Words are not only the keys of persuasion, but the triggers of action, and
those which have no purport but to counsel the violation of law can not
by any latitude of interpretation be a part of that public opinion which is
a final source of government in a democratic state.5
What at once marked these passages as worthy of the highest respect
was not merely the language, eloquent though it was, nor the
emergence of a new and more liberal test for free speech cases, but
rather the significant weighing and balancing of societal values which
is characteristic of only great judges. Judge Hand balanced in this case
the value to society of free speech, without which a free state is
doomed, against a state's interest in preserving unity and cohesiveness
in time of war. He concluded that the values flowing from free speech
were under the circumstances of the case at bar to be preferred to the
lesser value of silencing criticism of the war effort, which at most
was rather annoying and perverse than effective and dangerous.
Zechariah Chafee pointed out in 1919 the weakness of a great deal of
judicial construction of the Espionage Act:
The great trouble with most judicial construction of the Espionage Act
is that social interest has been ignored and free speech has been regarded
as merely an individual interest, which must readily give way like other
personal desires the moment it interferes with the social interest in
national safety .... The true boundary line of the First Amendment can
be fixed only when Congress and the courts realize that the principle
on which speech is classified as lawful or unlawful involves the balanc-
ing against each other of two very important social interests, in public
safety and the search for truth.6
There was little question that Judge Hand had properly weighed the
values involved in the decision, but whether or not he had interpreted
the statute according to the intention of the framers became a subject
of some discussion in the periodicals and in the press. The nation was
at war, and people, who would have been disposed to reason calmly
in less trying times, found the pressures of war an open invitation to
4. 244 Fed. at 540.
5. Ibid.
6. Chafee, Freedom of Speech in War Time, 32 HARv. L. REv. 932, 959-60
(1919).
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emotionalism. Attorney General Thomas E. Gregory on April 16, 1918,
in a speech before the Executive Committee of the American Bar As-
sociation, outlining his views as to the necessity of amending the act in
question, spoke in a critical manner of those judges who, like Learned
Hand, adopted a liberal construction of the statute. He said:
We secured passage of the Espionage Act, but most of the teeth which
we tried to put in were taken out. We got what we could, but Congress
itself did not realize at that time the conditions that would confront us.
To give you an idea of the ineffectiveness of that law when applied
by a judge not in accord with its purposes, I refer to a celebrated case
recently decided by a district judge of the United States. ... [A
description of the case followed here.] It seems practically impossible in
the district in which that judge presides to punish the disloyalty de-
nounced by this statute.7
Thomas F. Carroll writing in the Michigan Law Review 8 made an
exhaustive study of the Congressional debate leading up to the enact-
ment of the Espionage Act. He concluded that the debaters generally
agreed that the test of the limits of the freedom of the press was sub-
stantially that offered by Thomas M. Cooley in his edition of Black-
stone's Commentaries:
Every freeman has an undoubted right to lay what sentiments he
pleases before the public; to forbid this is to destroy the freedom of
the press; but if he publishes what is improper, mischievous, or illegal,
he must take the consequences of his own temerity. To punish any
dangerous or offensive writings, which, when published, shall upon fair
and impartial trial be adjudged of pernicious tendency, is necessary for
the preservation of peace and good order of government and religion,
the only foundations of civil liberty.9
The author's own view was that "Blackstone's definition was probably
not accepted unanimously by the framers of the Constitution, but was
adopted later by the Courts."'1 Carroll quoted a part of Judge Hand's
decision in the Masses case, but there was no indication as to whether
he approved the decision or not or whether he felt that it did violence
to the views of the founding fathers.
A note commenting upon "Recent Important Decisions" observed:
It would seem that such an interpretation of the act [referring to Learned
Hand's interpretation in the Masses case] deprives it of much of its force;
and that the opposition and agitation attendant upon its enactment was,
in view of such an application of it, all a crossing of a bridge which has
not been built as yet."1
7. Suggestions of Attorney-General Gregory to Executive Committee in Re-
lation to the Department of Justice, 4 A.B.A.J. 306 (1918).
8. Carroll, Freedom of Speech and of the Press in War Time: The Espionage
Act, 17 Mci. L. REV. 621, 626 (1919).
9. Quoted by Carroll and documented as Cooley's Blackstone, Book 4, 151-
52.
10. Carroll, supra note 8, at 626 n.13.
11. 16 M1cIH. L. REV. 131 (1917).
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No doubt the general opinion throughout America was that Judge
Hand had rendered an opinion doing scant service to the efforts of
those engaged in a crucial struggle, but the calm judgment that weighs
values is not noticeable by its prevalence in wartime. No doubt there
were among those who knew the decision people who felt that he had
not read properly the intentions of those who made the law, but re-
gardless of whether or not Judge Hand interpreted the statute accord-
ing to the intentions of its framers, his view of it was not yet to be
accepted as law. No sooner had the decision been rendered than coun-
sel for the Department of Justice obtained from Judge Charles M.
Hough of the United States Court of Appeals in New York a temporary
stay of the injunction which Judge Hand had granted, pending the
disposal of the issue by the Circuit Court of Appeals. Judge Hough in
a short opinion answered what he considered to be the two important
questions: First, was the view of the law expressed by Judge Hand
correct? Second, was it so clearly correct that the court should inter-
fere with the Postmaster General's findings? As to the first query,
Judge Hough argued:
[I]t is at least arguable whether there can be any more direct incite-
ment to action than to hold up to admiration those who do act. Oratio
obliqua has always been preferred by rhetoricians to oratio recta; the
Beatitudes have for some centuries been considered highly hortatory,
though they do not contain the injunction, "Go thou and do likewise."
At all events, it is a point plainly suitable for the attention of an appel-
late court. 12
With this reasoning he refused to accept Judge Hand's distinction be-
tween indirect and direct incitement. Answering the second query,
Judge Hough concluded that courts should not interfere with an
administrative interpretation of law affecting one of the great adminis-
trative departments of the executive domain except in the clearest
cases of abuse of discretion. He reasoned that the Postmaster General
had acted within his discretion.
In November 1917, the Masses case came on for hearing before the
Circuit Court of Appeals consisting of Ward and Rogers, Circuit
Judges, and Mayer, District Judge. Judge Rogers delivered the opinion
of the Court. He disagreed flatly with Judge Hand's interpretation of
the law and with his insistence that a distinction should be drawn
between indirect and direct incitement. Quoting Hand's statement,
"if one stops short of urging upon others that it is their duty or their
interest to resist the law, it geems to me that one should not be held
to have attempted to cause its violation,"' 3 Judge Rogers remarked:
12. Masses Publishing Co. v. Patten, 245 Fed. 102, 106 (2d Cir. 1917).
13. Id. at 105.
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This court does not agree that such is the law. If the natural and rea-
sonable effect of what is said is to encourage resistance to a law, and
the words are used in an endeavor to persuade to resistance, it, is im-
material that the duty to resist is not mentioned, or the interest of the
persons addressed in resistance is not suggested.14
The court went on to find that the Postmaster-General had not
abused his discretion by excluding The Masses from the mails. This
finding was justified by a discussion of the precedents and by reasoning
that denial of a service was not repression and might be withheld on
policy. It was pointed out that transportation facilities were still
available and that property had not been confiscated. Judge Ward in
a concurring opinion stressed that "not every writing the indirect effect
of which is to discourage recruiting or enlistment is within the
statute,"'1 5 and emphasized the requirement of specific intent.
When the two opinions, the one of Judge Hand, and the other by
Judge Rogers, are compared, it becomes strikingly apparent that the
one is the opinion of a judge who is a philosopher, a student of social
values, the other the opinion of a judge who reasoned within the
framework of legal principles and categories to the exclusion of broad
issues of social value underlying national life. Judge Hand's opinion
was destined to endure; it was made of the stuff of civilization; it was
anticipatory of the direction of movement of future events. Judge
Rogers' opinion was destined to consignment to the attic for legal
antiquarians. Temporarily, however, the Rogers opinion was signifi-
cant because it emphasized the test of the intent with which words are
uttered in determining criminal liability. This was to result in the
application of a substantive test that
• ..allowed conviction for any words which had an indirect effect to
discourage recruiting and the war spirit, like the poem about Emma
Goldman and the wind, if only the intention to discourage existed. In-
tention thus became the crucial test of guilt in any prosecution of op-
position to the government's war policies, and this requirement of inten-
tion became a mere form since it could be inferred from the existence
of the indirect injurious effect. 16
It resulted, furthermore, in fixing in the minds of the judiciary the
legality of the "bad tendency doctrine."
Partially as a result of the reversal of Learned Hand by the Court
of Appeals, in the year 1918 alone 998 cases were commenced under
the Espionage Act of 1917. Of these prosecutions 336 resulted in con-
victions, 57 defendants were acquitted, and 96 cases were pending at
the close of the year. Fines were levied amounting to the sum of
14. Masses Publishing Co. v. Patten, 246 Fed. 24, 38 (2d Cir. 1917).
15. Id. at 39.
16. CHAFEE, FREE SPEECH IN THE UNITED STATEs 50 (1941).
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$163,843.89.17 The total number of persons convicted under the statute
was stated by the Attorney General in his annual report at 887 out
of 1,956 cases in which prosecution was initiated.' In at least one case
people were imprisoned for criticizing the Red Cross and the Young
Men's Christian Association. 19 In many of these cases acquittals would
have been obtained by the application of Judge Hand's incitement
test. Professor Zechariah Chafee, writing in 1920, did not doubt but
that Judge Hand had been right in his construction of the law. "Look
at the Espionage Act of 1917 with a post-armistice mind," wrote Chafee,
"and it is clear that Judge Hand was right. °2 0 He considered that there
was no finer judicial statement during the war than Hand's opinion.
2 '
Mr. W. R. Vance, in an article dealing with the law regulating free
speech recognized the merits of the Hand test.z2 Citing this article,
Professor Chafee, wrote:
In England freedom of speech is necessarily protected only by jury trial
plus the common law rules of criminal attempt and solicitation, unlaw-
ful meetings, etc. . . . without the guidance of these rules the jury
would be far less valuable. Hence the merits of Judge Hand's test.23
In this connection Judge Charles F. Amidon wrote:
For the first six months after June 15, 1917, I tried war cases before jury-
men who were candid, sober, intelligent business men whom I had
known for thirty years, and who under ordinary circumstances would
have had the highest respect for my declarations of law, but during that
period they looked back into my eyes with the savagery of wild animals,
saying by their manner, "Away with this twiddling, let us get at him."
Men believed during that period that the only verdict in a war case, which
could show loyalty, was a verdict of guilty.24
If this state of affairs was typical of other jurisdictions, so fierce a
willingness to convict could scarcely have been held in check by the
inviting latitude of the "bad tendency test" as laid down by Judge
Rogers when he overruled Learned Hand in the Masses case.
Although Judge Hand was obliged to adhere to the superior court's
ruling in the next case that came before him involving the interpre-
tation to be given the Espionage Act,2 nevertheless, he pointed out
that the pamphlets in question remained "entirely within the range
of discussion, and at common law would not, I think, subject their
17. Carroll, supra note 8, at 655 n.90.
18. Ibid.
19. CHAFEE, op. cit. supra note 16, at 46.
20. Ibid.
21. Ibid.
22. Vance, Freedom of Speech and of the Press, 2 IVLnN. L. REv. 260 (1918).
23. CHAFEE, op. cit. supra note 16, at 70.
24. Ibid.
25. United States v. Nearing, 252 Fed. 223 (S.D.N.Y. 1918).
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author to criminal responsibility . . . no matter what his intent."26
Although Judge Hand recognized that he was bound by the holding
of the upper court, he still narrowed the rule of the case considerably
when he applied it in the Nearing case. In reference to that rule he
wrote:
Whatever may be the rule at common law, I understand Masses Pub. Co.
v. Patten, 246 Fed. 24, 158 C.C.A., 250 Ann. Cas. 1918B 999, to lay down
an added measure of criminal liability under this statute to the utter-
ance of words which may cause insubordination, or may obstruct the
enlistment service. In that case, it is true, there is language which,
taken broadly, can be made to mean that the author is liable if he
merely knows that his words will so result. This I can hardly think can
have been the significance of the decision, since, as I have already shown,
the inevitable consequence would be to imperil any discussion of public
matters. It certainly was not the purpose of that case to do so, or indeed
to insist that the style or manner of the discussion must measure with
any standard of taste or temperance. Such a result would be foreign
to the whole history of the subject.27
Judges like Hand and Amidon who attempted to liberalize the con-
struction of the Act, however, were few and far between. 28 The pas-
sions of the war and the temper of the times were not to be assuaged.
It took calmer years of peace to appreciate the wisdom of their views.
Yet the Masses case was in the record and its philosophy was to win
converts.2
THE ROOTS OF THE "CLEAR AND PRESENT DANGER" DOCTRINE
On March 3, 1919, Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes handed down for
the Supreme Court his famous opinion in the case of Schenck v. United
States.3 By this time almost all of the district court cases had been
disposed of, and the armistice had been signed. Judge Hand's opinion
in the Masses case was by now almost two years old. Schenck and the
other defendants had mailed circulars urging in impassioned language
men who had passed exemption boards to assert their rights and
charging that conscription was unconstitutional and despotic. Clearly,
the language used could have been considered barred under Learned
Hand's test of direct and dangerous incitement to unlawful resistance.
Justice Holmes speaking for a unanimous Court upheld the convic-
26. Id. at 228.
27. Ibid.
28. CHAFEE, op. cit. supra note 16, at 74-79 for a discussion of charges by
judges to juries.
29. Judge Charles Wyzanski thinks the merits of the case lay not in new
constructional concepts, but "in its adherence to ancient doctrines of liberty
in construing a statute loose in phraseology and uncertain in coverage."
Wyzanski, Judge Learned Hand's Contributions to Public Law, 60 HARV. L.
REV. 348-69 (1947).
30. 249 U.S. 47 (1919).
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tion of Schenck in an opinion which contained the words of the famous
"clear and present danger" test:
We admit that in many places and in ordinary times the defendants in
saying all that was said in the circular would have been within their
constitutional rights. But the character of every act depends upon the
circumstances in which it is done. . . . The question in every case is
whether the words used are used in such circumstances and are of such
a nature as to create a clear and present danger that they will bring
about the substantive evils that Congress has a right to prevent.31 (Em-
phasis added.)
Whether Holmes in formulating his statement of the "clear and
present danger" test was influenced directly by Hand's language in
the Masses case opinion cannot be determined. The answer lies in the
realm of conjecture. That Holmes was acquainted with the Masses
case may be readily inferred. The case had made a splash in judicial
waters. Holmes knew Hand, naturally enough, and soon was to write
Sir Frederick Pollock that he considered him Supreme Court timber.
Whatever the seminal relationship between the Schenck case and the
Masses case may be, it cannot be denied that the two tests are strik-
ingly similar. The greatest difference is that of the two formulas;
Hand's is the more objective. From the viewpoint of content and his-
torical background they are two limbs from the same tree. Under both
tests words are criminal only because of their causal relationship to
an evil from which society is justified in protecting itself. Under both
tests the gravity and the imminency of the danger are material cir-
cumstantial factors. Both permit a wide latitude for hostile criticism
and discussion in the realm of political ideas. Under both tests words
and intentions are not punishable for their critical, caustic quality nor
for their tendency to produce an evil but because of their direct in-
citement to action which society is justified in preventing.
In his opinion in the Masses case Judge Hand had recognized that
the basis of his decision derived from the common law test of incite-
ment to unlawful conduct. Karl N. Llewellyn said in 1919 of the
Holmes formula:
The test laid down by Justice Holmes in the above passage [quoting the
"clear and present danger" passage] is that of common law incitement to
crime. It is a sound test. The Constitution was never intended-to privilege
such incitement.32
In 1920 Edward S. Corwin recognized the relationship between Judge
Hand's test and the Holmes doctrine. He wrote:
31. Id. at 52.
32. Llewellyn, Free Speech in Time of Peace, 29 YALE L.J. 337, 338 (1920).
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The issue raised by Justice Holmes is at basis the historical issue. He is
at one with those who urge that Congress must stop short, in its regulation
of speech and the press, with punishing words which "directly incite
to acts in violation of law" and which "bring the speaker's [or writer's]
unlawful intention reasonably near to success.33
Zechariah Chafee wrote in 1919:
This portion of the opinion [quoting the Holmes "clear and present
danger" passage in the Schenck case] especially the italicized sentence
substantially agrees with the conclusion reached by Judge Hand, by
Schofield, and by investigation of the history and political purpose of
the First Amendment. 34
Professor Chafee again in the 1941 edition of his study of free speech
in the United States discussed the similarity of the two doctrines and
expressed his admiration for Judge Hand's test as being administra-
tively more objective:
The Supreme Court's opinion in the Schenck case lends much support
to the views of Judge Learned Hand, in the Masses case. Justice Holmes
does interpret the Espionage Act somewhat more widely than Judge
Hand, in making the nature of the words only one element of the danger,
and in not requiring that the utterances shall in themselves satisfy an
objective standard. Thus he loses the great administrative advantages
of Judge Hand's test.35
Again in the same connection Professor Chafee commented:
The Debs decision showed clearly the evils of the broad construction
of the Espionage Act, which rejected Judge Learned Hand's objective
standard of the meaning of the words used.
36
In the final analysis, what is remarkable about Judge Hand's opinion
in the Masses case is that he as a district judge had no formula to guide
him-only the old opinions enshrining Blackstone's doctrine of no
prior censorship, and the analogies to be drawn from the common law.
This was scant judicial comfort to a courageous and enlightened judge
steeped in Mill and Milton and gifted with the ability to see social
values and individual values in the proper relationship. That he so
early designed a test in substance so like the one that later became a
judicial vade mecum is indicative of the breadth of his valor and the
penetration of his intellectual vision.
Although it can be established beyond doubt that Judge Hand enun-
33. Corwin, Freedom of Speech and Press Under the First Amendment:
A Resume, 30 YALE L.J. 48, 54 (1920).
34. Chafee, Freedom of Speech in War Time, 32 HARV. L. REv. 932, 967
(1919).
35. CHAFF., op. cit. supra note 16, at 82.
36. Id. at 85.
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ciated in 1917 substantially the same test as that offered by Justice
Holmes in 1919, the roots of both tests trail far into the judicial past.
It is startling to discover that in the year 1818 the Council of Revision
of the State of New York composed of Governor Clinton, Chancellor
James Kent, Chief Justice Thompson, and Justices Van Ness, Yates,
and Platt phrased almost the same doctrine. The circumstances were
these: Eunice Chapman was married to James Chapman in New York
in the year 1804 by whom she had three children and with whom she
lived until 1811 when James Chapman abandoned his wife and joined
a religious sect, the Shakers. Subsequently, he took his three children
from his wife and kept them concealed from her, claiming that his
marriage contract was at an end along with his obligation to support
his wedded wife. The Legislature of the State of New York in an Act
entitled, "Bill for the Relief of Eunice Chapman and for other Pur-
poses . . ." dissolved the marriage by statutory authority and without
judicial inquiry, and further empowered the chancellor to award the
children of marriages, one spouse of which had joined the Shakers, to
that parent who had not joined the sect. Said the Council of Revision,
speaking through Judge Platt:
If the Legislature can constitutionally deprive a parent of his parental
rights merely because he is a Shaker, they have an equal right for the
same cause to disfranchise him of every other privilege, or to banish
him or even put him to death. If the principle be admitted, it must rest
in discretion alone how far it shall be carried in the measure of punish-
ment. There is no evidence that the Society of Shakers are guilty of any
acts of licentiousness or any practice inconsistent with the peace and
safety of this state; and although we lament what to us appear absurd
errors in their religious creed, yet, so long as they preserve the character
which they now possess for sobriety, industry, and peaceful habits, the
Council can not regard them as having forfeited the protection afforded
by that article of the Constitution. To justify such an act of denunciation
the danger to the peace and safety of this State must not be merely
speculative, remote, and possible but imminent and certain.37
Felicitously considering the equities, if not the constitutional issues
involved, the Legislature passed the Act over the Council's revision.38
Several scholars, among them Zechariah Chafee, find the seeds of
the "clear and present danger" doctrine in the common law of criminal
attempt. Others have pointed to the analogy with the English law of
seditious libel. Giles J. Patterson is among the latter. He wrote in 1939:
This doctrine of "clear and present danger" finds a parallel in the English
law of seditious libel upon the King's ministers and government. In those
cases the jury is required to consider the state of the country and public
37. STREET, THE COUNCIL OF REVIsIoN OF THE STATE OF NEw YORK AND
ITS VETOES 386-87 (1859).
38. Id. at 388.
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opinion at the time of publication. Writings which might, in times of
peace and public tranquility be innocent, might, in times of war or insur-
rection, be dangerous. For this reason criminal ex officio informations
for seditious libel are permitted only in cases that are of so "dangerous
a nature as to call for immediate suppression" and such as are "likely to
cause immediate outrage, public riot, and disturbances." 39
Justice Rutledge in a dissenting opinion in Everson v. Board of Edu-
cation expressed the view that the origin of the "clear and present
danger" rule could be found in the Virginia Statute for Establishing
Religious Freedom. Wrote Justice Rutledge:
Possibly the first official declaration of the "clear and present danger"
doctrine was Jefferson's declaration in the Virginia Statute for Estab-
lishing Religious Freedom: "That it is time enough for the righteous
purposes of civil government for its officers to interfere when principles
break out into overt acts against peace and good order."40
Wherever the roots of the doctrine may lead, it is evident that in its
substance it did not spring full blown from the head of Oliver Wendell
Holmes one March day. There is evidence to show that he had con-
sidered the problem before, and it is likely that the phraseology was
a result of the fusion of ideas and words previously employed.41 It is
possible that Judge Learned Hand's thinking contributed to the
Holmes formulation.
FREE SPEECH IN AN INDUSTRIAL CONTEST
After the subsidence of the passions engendered by World War I,
fewer cases involving the issue of the latitude to be given speech
reached the courts. The "clear and present danger" doctrine, however,
was amplified and developed by Justices Holmes and Brandeis in a
series of brilliant and famous dissenting opinions. 42 Their views, how-
ever, were not used by a Supreme Court majority to invalidate a con-
viction until 1937. After this date the Holmes-Brandeis philosophy
experienced a remarkable development at the hands of the Roosevelt
Court. It was expanded to protect a variety of social interests includ-
39. PATTERSON, FREE SPEECH AND A FREE PRESS 155 (1939).
40. Quoted in Antieau, The Rule of Clear and Present Danger-Its Origin
and Application, 13 U. DET. L.J. 198, 199 (1950).
41. See Antieau, supra note 40, at 198-99. Also see Shientag, From Seditious
Libel to Freedom of the Press, 11 BROOxLYN L. REV. 125-54 (1942), for an
account of historical relationships. See also Hall, The Substantive Law of
Crimes 1887-1936, 50 HARV. L. REV. 616-21 (1937); Green. Liberty Under the
Fourteenth Amendment, 27 WASH. U.L.Q. 497-540 (1942) ; Note, Verbal Acts and
Ideas, 16 U. Cm. L. REV. 328-33 (1949).
42. See dissenting opinions in Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 672 (1925);
Gilbert v. Minnesota, 254 U.S. 325, 334 (1920) (Brandeis alone dissenting);
Pierce v. United States, 252 U.S. 239, 253 (1920); Schaefer v. United States,
251 U.S. 466, 495 (1920); Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 624 (1919).
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ing, in addition to freedom of the press and speech, the freedoms of
religion4 3 and assembly.44
Judge Hand made no significant contribution to this development.
Cases involving such issues did not come before his court, and the
failure of the Chief Executive to appoint him to the Supreme Bench
deprived the nation of his unusual talents as a judge. Several cases
involving the use to be made of the new view in a context of indus-
trial disputes do deserve examination because they revealed facets of
his thinking on the subject of special values protected by the First
Amendment.
In NLRB v. Federbush Co.,45 Judge Hand had before him the ques-
tion as to what extent an employer's words are privileged when ad-
dressed to an employee for the purpose of impeding the organization of
a labor union. Federbush in a talk with one of his employees who was
active in efforts to organize the Federbush factory had said that the
union was "just a bunch of racketeers ... trying to collect dues and it
won't get you anywhere in the end. They won't secure you a job. '46
After the employee had informed him that he already held a union
card, Federbush added words to the effect that if the plant were to be
organized, the company would be unable to operate for more than six
months out of the year. Later he asked the same employee "why he
was turning against the firm by joining the union."47
Judge Hand thought this conversation a trivial matter but, since the
Board had seen fit to make it the occasion for an injunction, he could
not say that its order should not be enforced. To the respondent's argu-
ment that his privilege of free speech had been infringed, Judge Hand
answered:
No doubt an employer is as free as anyone else in general to broadcast
any arguments he chooses against trade-unions; but it does not follow
that he may do so to all audiences. The privilege of "free speech," like
other privileges, is not absolute; it has its seasons; a democratic society
has an acute interest in its protection and can not indeed live without it;
but it is an interest measured by its purpose. That purpose is to enable
others to make an informed judgment as to what concerns them, and
ends so far as the utterances do not contribute to the result. Language may
serve to enlighten a hearer, though it also betrays the speaker's feelings
and desires; but the light it sheds will be in some degree clouded, if the
hearer is in his power. Arguments by an employer directed to his em-
ployees have such an ambivalent character; they are legitimate enough
as such and pro tanto the privilege of free speech protects them; but, so
far as they also disclose his wishes, as they generally do, they have a force
independent of persuasion. The Board is vested with the power to measure
43. Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940).
44. Herndon v. Lowry, 301 U.S. 242 (1937).
45. 121 F.2d 954 (2d Cir. 1941).




these two factors against each other, a power whose exercise does not
trench upon the First Amendment. Words are not pebbles in alien
juxtaposition; they have only a communal existence; and not only does
the meaning of each interpenetrate the other, but all their aggregate take
their purport from the setting in which they are used, of which the re-
lation between the speaker and the hearer is perhaps the most important
part. What to an outsider will be no more than the vigorous presentation
of a conviction, to an employee may be the manifestation of a determina-
tion which it is not safe to thwart. The Board must decide how far the
second aspect obliterates the first.48
Two important views are advanced in this passage. First, that
the purpose for which society guards free speech is to enable people
to secure information on which to base sound judgments, and second,
that the true purport of language is to be determined from the con-
text in which it is expressed and the setting in which it is used.
From the first it appears that Judge Hand's statement is immune from
the charge made by Alexander Meickeljohn 49 that the Holmes in-
terpretation of the basis of free speech provided only a means for
winning new truth and not a means for sharing the truth that has been
won, since Hand stressed the basic value of sharing information
available to men in society. From the second, it may be inferred
that Judge Hand still regarded the nature and character of the words
and the circumstances surrounding their use as prime elements in
determining whether or not they should be held privileged.
The second case that demands consideration is International Brother-
hood of Electrical Workers, Local 501 v. NLRB.50 In this case the
National Labor Relations Board filed a petition against the Interna-
tional Brotherhood and others for a review of an order directing the
union to cease and desist from inducing and encouraging a secondary
boycott as an unfair labor practice under the Labor Management Re-
lations Act of 1947. The facts were these: A contractor named
Giorgi, who had agreed to build a house for the owner of a lot in
Greenwich, Connecticut, let out the carpentry to a sub-contractor
named Deltorto, and the electrical work to another sub-contractor
named Langer. On the day here involved, Deltorto had two carpen-
ters on the job, members of an AFL union; but Langer, who was a
non-union employer, had none. One Patterson, the business repre-
sentative of the local, learning that the electrical work was being
done by non-union labor, went to Deltorto and one of his carpenters
and told them what he had learned. Later in the day Patterson told
Deltorto and both carpenters that the job was unfair, and began to
picket the premises with the usual slogan. As a result of Patterson's
48. Id. at 957.
49. MEICKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITs RELATION TO SELF GOVERNMENT 88
(1948).
50. 181 F.2d 34 (2d Cir. 1950).
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actions, the carpenters quit work. Georgi was told by Patterson that
he would have to replace Langer, who was informed of the circum-
stances and agreed to throw up his contract.
Judge Hand, speaking for the Court of Appeals, affirmed the cease-
and-desist order and entered an enforcement decree. Dealing with
the free speech aspects of the case, he wrote:
It has never been held, save by the most extreme partisans, if, indeed,
even by them, that the First Amendment protected all verbal acts as
such. The interest which it guards, and which gives it its importance,
presupposes that there are no orthodoxies-religious, political, economic,
or scientific-which are immune from debate or dispute. Back of that
is an assumption-itself an orthodoxy, and the one permissible exception-
that truth will be more likely to emerge, if no limitations are imposed
upon utterances that can with any plausibility be regarded as efforts to
present grounds for accepting or rejecting propositions whose truth the
utterer asserts, or denies. No doubt it is difficult to know when an
equivocal utterance has plainly emerged out of its penumbra into the
full light of unalloyed incitement; and that difficulty may justify pro-
tecting all that are within the ambivalent area. . . . The First Amend-
ment does not excuse picketing to compel the employer to join the com-
bination [referring to a combination in restraint of trade] even though
the pickets carry placards which bear statements of the grievances in-
volved. Such utterances are not within any shadow zone which ex-
empts them, as being addressed to the reason, as designed to convince
others upon the merits. . . . Congress, in search for a compromise be-
tween the conflicting interests of employees in collective bargaining and
that of neutrals in avoiding involvements in quarrels not their own, de-
cided to draw a line at secondary boycotts; and the propriety of the de-
cision is not for us. The constitutional limitations upon its realization are
of course as absolute as upon the realization of any other legislative de-
cision; but it should not be forgotten that the words which have so
often been repeated as though they were a definite rubric in this field,
[Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 627] were introduced by the
following clause: "I do not doubt for a moment that upon the same
reasoning that would justify persuasion to murder, the United States
constitutionally may punish.. .. 51
As in the decision in the Federbush case,5 2 once more Judge Hand
pointed up the social interests to be protected by providing a broad
latitude for unrestrained speech. In this case Judge Hand stressed
the truth-discovering function of free speech as in the Federbush case
53
he had emphasized the truth-sharing function. There are no ortho-
doxies immune from dispute. But what are the limits? For limits there
are. When an equivocal utterance "has emerged out of its penumbra
into the full light of unalloyed incitement,"54 there the limit must be
drawn! But even more important than the limits set for speech,
51. Id. at 40.
52. See text and note 45 supra.
53. Ibid.
54. See quoted text and note 51 supra.
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limits which he had drawn before, was his reference to the "clear and
present danger" rule-"words which have so often been repeated
as though they were a definite rubric in this field. '55 Clearly, this
is not the language of veneration. Implicit in the opinion is the Hand
view that formulas outwear their usefulness when they are stretched
to cover circumstances and purposes for which they were never in-
vented. His reference to the words with which Justice Holmes pref-
aced his famous statement called attention to the reasoning behind it,
and that reasoning was founded upon the old common law of incite-
ment to unlawful conduct. Only when an equivocal utterance can
plainly be labeled incitement should it be suppressed, and doubtful
cases may justify privilege.
In two other cases Judge Hand dealt with the free speech issue as
it directly affected instruments of communication. In National Broad-
casting Co. v. United States,56 he briefly referred to an argument
drawn from the first amendment, but only to find that even though
the action of the Federal Communication Commission in forbidding
certain contracts with the networks did coerce their choice and
freedom; yet, since it was done for the very purpose of protecting the
same interests which the amendment guarded, no question of its
applicability arose under the circumstances. This case evolved out
of the practice of large networks compelling local stations not to
broadcast any feature issued by a competing network, a practice
which deprived people in certain localities of hearing programs in
which they were interested. As a matter of fact, the practice had pre-
vented the broadcasting of the World Series baseball playoff by
stations that were affiliated with other networks than the Mutual
Broadcasting Corporation. The Supreme Court agreed with Learned
Hand and affirmed his decision.57
Perhaps an even more important decision came before a special
three judge federal district court for the Southern District of New
York in 1943. Judge Hand, speaking for the court, handed dbwn the
decision with Judge Swan dissenting.58 Here the United States
charged that the Associated Press and others had conspired to restrain
and monopolize interstate commerce in violation of the Sherman
Anti-Trust Act59 and the Clayton Act60 and asked that they be
enjoined. The suit was instituted on the theory that the Associated
Press by refusing its services to non-members or new newspapers
except by leave of competitors who were already members, and upon
financially well-nigh prohibitory terms, created an actionable re-
55. Ibid.
56. 47 F. Supp. 940 (S.D.N.Y. 1942).
57. National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190 (1942).
58. United States v. Associated Press, 52 F. Supp. 362 (S.D.N.Y. 1943).
59. 26 STAT. 209-10 (1890), 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 1-7 (1951).
60. Act of Oct. 15. 1914, c. 323, §§ 1-2, 38 STAT. 730 (codified in scattered sec-
tions of 15, 28, 29 U.S.C.A.).
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straint of trade. Although the decision involved principally ques-
tions of administrative law and the meaning and application of
the Sherman Act, it became necessary for the court to dispose of
the'free speech aspectof the case because both sides sought to invoke
the first amendment. The government argued that the practices com-
plained of involved freedom of the press because they prevented
newspapers from giving to the public as broad a news coverage as
they could provide if they had the services of the Associated Press at
their disposal. The Associated Press argued that any interference with
their established practice in respect to a policy adopted for the pro-
motion of their business was an interference with their ancient
liberty. Judge Hand, while resting his opinion upon an interpretation
of the statutes controlling and the facts of the case as they came
within those legislative mandates, did recognize that the interests
which the government sought to protect were closely akin to those
protected by the first amendment. He wrote:
However, neither exclusively, nor even primarily, are the interests of the
newspaper industry conclusive; for that industry serves one of the most
vital of all general interests: the dissemination of news from as many
different sources, and with as many different facets and colors as is
possible. That interest is closely akin to, if indeed it is not the same as,
the interest protected by the First Amendment; it presupposes that the
right conclusions are more likely to be gathered out of a multitude of
tongues, than through any kind of authoritative selection. To many this is,
and always will be, folly; but we have staked upon it our all.61
He answered the contention of the Associated Press that the freedom
of the press would suffer by any interference with their practices by
holding:
The effect of our judgment will be, not to restrict AP members as to
what they shall print, but only to compel them to make their dispatches
accessible to others. We do not understand on what theory that com-
pulsion can be thought relevant to this issue; the mere fact that a
person is engaged in publishing does not exempt him from ordinary
municipal law, so long as he remains unfettered in his own selection of
what to publish. All we do is to prevent him from keeping that ad-
vantage for himself.
62
This case reached the Supreme Court in 1944 and produced a
freshet of concurring and dissenting opinions.6 3 The Court upheld the
decision of Judge Hand in its majority opinion but reached its con-
clusions by a different route. Justice Frankfurter, however, con-
curred in an opinion that rested squarely upon the reasoning of the
opinion by the lower court. He quoted with approval Judge Hand's
61. 52 F. Supp. at 372.
62. Id. at 374.
63. Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1 (1945).
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statement of the close relationship between the public interest pro-
tected by the first amendment and that which the lower court sought
by its holding to protect and foster.6 Justice Black, who wrote the
minority opinion, while not quoting Judge Hand, agreed with him
substantially on the freedom-of-the-press aspect of the case and wrote:
Freedom to publish is guaranteed by the Constitution, but freedom to
combine to keep others from publishing is not.65
He further expressed himself in respect to a side of the free speech
question that has as yet received little judicial attention by saying:
Freedom of the press from governmental interference under the First
Amendment does not sanction repression of that freedom by private
interests.66
Justice Roberts, in an opinion with which the Chief Justice joined,
disagreed with the Hand opinion. He reasoned that the question in-
volved matters of public policy that the courts should have left for
legislative determination. Learned Hand knew that courts had been
making peripheral policy decisions since the first judge climbed to a
rickety bench. His answer to Justice Roberts' view was contained in
his opinion:
[I]t is a mistake to suppose that courts are never called upon to make
similar choices; i.e., to appraise and balance the value of opposed interests
and to enforce their preference. The law of torts is for the most part
the result of exactly that process, and the law of torts has been judge-
made, especially in this very branch. Besides, even though we had more
scruples than we do, we have here a legislative warrant, because Con-
gress has incorporated into the Anti-Trust Acts the changing standards of
the common law, and by so doing has delegated to the courts the duty
of fixing the standard for each case. Congress might have proceeded
otherwise; it might have turned the whole matter over to an administrative
tribunal, as indeed to a limited extent it has done to the Federal Trade
Commission. But, though it has acted, it has left these particular
controversies to the courts where they have been from very ancient
times.6 7
THE DENNis CASE
One more free speech case was to be decided before Learned Hand
put aside his judicial robes for the retirement which he had so richly
earned. This was the case of Dennis v. United States,68 to some, one
of the most crucial cases to come before the courts of the United
States in many years.69
64. Id. at 28.
65. Id. at 20.
66. Ibid.
67. United States v. Associated Press, 52 F. Supp. 362, 370 (S.D.N.Y. 1943).
68. 183 F.2d 201 (2d Cir. 1950).
69. See Justice Frankfurter's statement in Dennis v. United States, 341
U.S. 494, 517 (1951).
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This case arose out of circumstances which the government be-
lieved fell within the prohibitions of the Smith Act of 1940.70 This
act makes it unlawful for any person:
(1) to knowingly or willfully advocate, abet, advise, or teach the duty
necessity, desirability, or propriety of overthrowing or destroying
any government in the United States by force or violence, or by the
assassination of any officer of such government;
(2) with the intent to cause the overthrow or destruction of any govern-
ment in the United States, to print, edit, issue, circulate, sell, dis-
tribute, or publicly display any written or printed matter advocating,
advising or teaching the duty, necessity, desirability or propriety
of overthrowing or destroying any government in the United States
by force or violence;
(3) to organize or help to organize any society, group or assembly of
persons who teach, advocate, or encourage the overthrow or de-
struction of any government in the United States by force or violence;
or to be or become a member of, or affiliate with, any such society,
group, or assembly of persons, knowing the purposes thereof.
Section 3 of the Act provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person to attempt to commit, or to conspire
to commit, any of the acts prohibited by the provisions of this title.
The foregoing provisions were merely a part of an Act which was
directed principally at revising the laws respecting aliens in the
United States. Unfortunately, congressional debates offer little help
concerning the proper interpretation to be given its words.7 1 Obviously,
it must have been supposed that the words used would be given their
usual meaning. It is, however, clear that the provisions of the law
quoted above were directed at the activities of the communists in
the United States. Senator Connally while explaining the bill to
his colleagues in the Senate remarked:
Another provision makes it unlawful to organize or help to organize
any society, group, or assembly of persons who seek, advocate, or en-
courage the overthrow or destruction of any government in the United
States by force or violence. That is probably the broadest provision
in the bill.... That applies to such organizations as those of the Com-
munists and others who openly advocate the overthrow of the government
by force or violence. . . . [It] should not disturb anyone, because it
relates only to those who advocate, not a change of the Government un-
der constitutional processes, not a change of the Government under demo-
cratic institutions, but the overthrow of the Government by force or
violence.7 2
Evidently the Congress desired to leave the problem of limiting the
statute to square with the Constitution to the courts, for it provided
70. Act of June 28, 1940, c. 439, §§ 1-5, 54 STAT. 670.
71. See 86 CONG. REc. 8340-47, 9029-36 (1940), for debates.
72. Id. at 8342.
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if any provision were held unconstitutional the remainder of the
Act should not be affected thereby, and by further providing that if
"the application thereof to any person or circumstance, is held in-
valid.., the application.., to other persons or circumstances" should
not be affected.73
Whatever may be said in criticism of this willingness of Congress
to write legislation in broad terms and pass the burden of interpreta-
tion to the courts, there can be little doubt that the framers desired
to write as broad a law as possible and leave to the courts the ques-
tion of fitting the shoe to the last. There can be little doubt, too, that
the Act, as it was passed, represented the almost unanimous will
of the representatives of the people in respect to what they considered
to be a grave problem, for the final vote in the House on the Conference
Committee report carried with only four dissents.74
Title II of the Alien Registration Act of 1940, commonly called the
Smith Act, was by implication held constitutional when the Supreme
Court in Dunne v. United States75 refused certiorari; but it was not
until the Dennis case that the Supreme Court directly passed upon
the question of its constitutionality under the first amendment.
Judge Learned Hand wrote the opinion for the court of appeals,
and he was sustained by the majority of the Supreme Court. It was
Judge Hand's interpretation of the "clear and present danger" doc-
trine that was adopted in the opinion of Chief Justice Vinson, and
it is this opinion that is now the law of the land on such questions.
In the winter of 1949, Eugene Dennis and other leaders of the Com-
munist Party were indicted for conspiracy to violate Section 2 of
the Smith Act. The trial extended over many months and ultimately
resulted in the conviction of the defendants in the United States Dis-
trict Court for the Southern District of New York presided over by
Judge Harold Medina. The trial was widely discussed and publicized
and soon became a cause celebre. In June 1950, the case was argued
before the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, and on August 1,
1950, Learned Hand delivered the opinion of the court. This opinion
affirmed the judgment of the district court and further amplified
Judge Hand's views on freedom of speech and the press.
Having determined that the evidence was sufficient to support the
verdict, Judge Hand concluded that three questions arose: First, was
the Act constitutional as construed by the judge in the lower court?
Second, was this construction the proper one? Third, was the evidence
adduced admissible under the indictment? He proceeded to a dis-
cussion of the issues presented by the case. First came a discussion of
73. Act of June 28, 1940, c. 439, §§ 40-41, 54 STAT. 676 (codified in scattered
sections of 8, 18, U.S.C.A.).
74. 86 CONG. REc. 9036 (1940).
75. 138 F.2d 137 (8th Cir. 1943), cert. denied, 320 U.S. 790 (1943).
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the social interests protected by the first amendment. The Judge
reasoned that the interests protected thereunder "rest upon a skep-
ticism as to all political orthodoxy" and upon a "belief that there are
no impregnable political absolutes," and that "a flux of tentative doc-
trines is preferable to any authoritative creeds." He admitted that
the premise was as yet unproved and was perhaps "incompatible with
men's impatience of a suspended judgment" when the stakes were
high. He found it relatively easy to deal with utterances that were
strictly incitement but hard to determine the privilege due utterances
that were at once "both an effort to affect the hearer's beliefs and a
call upon them to act when they have been convinced."7 6 For help he
turned to an analysis of the cases marking the emergence and the
subsequent amplification of the "clear and present danger" rule in
an attempt to discover its true meaning. He found that the cases failed
to show a clear directive. Analyzing the opinion of Justice Brandeis
in Whitney v. California7 7 to the effect that he would hold a conspiracy
protected, though its execution were deferred to the first propitious
moment, he concluded that the reasoning behind those words was
that delay in execution would provide opportunity for the corrective
of public discussion. He felt that Justice Brandeis would have not
been of the same opinion "if the conspirators had sought to mask their
purposes by fair words" as in the case at bar, and he pointed out
that even Brandeis agreed that the Court had not fixed the standard
by which to determine when a danger should be adjudged clear or
how imminent it should be to justify repression of speech. He agreed
that in American Communications Ass'n v. Douds78 all of the Justices
had stressed that there must be some clear and present danger that
the utterance would succeed in creating a substantive evil within the
control of Congress; but he felt that other statements in the controlling
opinion indicated that the rule was not an automatic formula for the
solution of speech cases but rather a rubric for pointing up the ne-
cessity for a careful balancing of competing social interests in order
to accord protection to the more demanding one under the particular
circumstances presented by the case to be decided. Finally, from
his analysis of the relevant cases he concluded that:
No longer can there be any doubt, if indeed there was before, that the
phrase, "clear and present danger," is not a slogan or shibboleth to be
applied as though it carried its own meaning; but that it involves in every
case a comparison between interests which are to be appraised qualita-
tively.79 (Emphasis added.)
76. The phrases in quotation marks are found in 183 F.2d at 207.
77. 274 U.S. 357, 376 (1927).
78. 339 U.S. 382 (1950).




[Tihe phrase, "clear and present danger," has come to be used as a short
hand statement of those among such mixed or compounded utterances
(utterances which are at the same time persuasions to belief and calls to
action) which the Amendment does not protect. Yet it is not a vade mecum;
indeed from its very words it could not be. It is a way to describe a
penumbra of occasions, even the outskirts of which are indefinable, but
within which, as is so often the case, the courts must find their way as
they can. In each case they must ask whether the gravity of the "evil,"
discounted by its improbability justifies such invasion of free speech as is
necessary to avoid the danger. We have purposely substituted "im-
probability" for "remoteness," because that must be the right interpre-
tation. Given the same probability, it would be wholly irrational to
condone future evils which we should prevent were they immediate; that
could be reconciled only by an indifference to those who come after
us.80 (Emphasis added.)
Utilizing the rule as he had interpreted it as "grave and probable
danger," Judge Hand argued from a consideration of the nature and
character of the Communist Party and from the record of its activities
in America and its successful subversion in other lands as evidenced
by recent history that such a conspiracy as charged in the indictment
and substantiated by the admissible evidence created a danger of ut-
most gravity and of enough probability to justify its suppression.
Passing to the argument that the statute must be limited to be
constitutional, the Judge admitted that the statute was so broad as
to make criminal the "fulminations of a half crazy zealot on a soap
box, calling for an immediate march upon Washington,"' 1 but he found
that Congress had limited the statute in a saving manner by explicitly
declaring that it wanted the words to govern all cases where they
constitutionally could. Nor was the act invalid for vagueness. True
Congress could have added the qualifying clause, "when that consti-
tutes clear and present danger" after the words "teach" and "help
to organize," but since this phrase was so "imprecise" and involved in
its interpretation such utmost difference of opinion, this would not
have helped a great deal to clarify the act; nor could the Congress
prescribe a rule for each occasion. The statute by requiring specific
intent was cleared of any vagueness that might make it otherwise ob-
jectionable, since the conduct prohibited was made criminal only in
case the accused knew that what he intended was unlawful.
The defendants had excepted to that part of Judge Harold Medina's
charge that took from the jury the question of whether the danger
to be avoided was sufficient to justify the act under the first amend-
ment and left with them only the decision as to whether the de-
fendants' intent was to overthrow the government as speedily as
80. Ibid.
81. Id. at 214.
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circumstances would permit. Therefore Judge Hand had to pass
upon the thorny question of whether or not the court had erred in
this respect. He decided that, although the degree of probability or
imminency of the danger is a question of fact, a determination of this
fact involved a choice between conflicting social interests and there-
fore became a choice for the legislature or the courts when they be-
came the legislature's surrogate for this purpose. To leave this ques-
tion to juries would, in Judge Hand's opinion, preclude opportunity
for judicial review and result in a multiplicity of decisions destructive
of the necessary uniformity and certainty. He distinguished the
holding in Pierce v. United States82 on the ground that the holding
there was addressed to the question of the sufficiency of the evidence
to support the verdict. He further reasoned that a question of the
constitutionality and interpretation of a statute was a judicial ques-
tion upon which juries were not competent to pass under the American
system of jurisprudence.
83
Judge Hand concluded an opinion remarkable for its facility in ex-
tracting the really crucial issues by saying:
The record discloses a trial fought with a persistence, an ingenuity and
-we must add-with a perversity, such as we have rarely, if ever, en-
countered. It is of course possible that the defendants are inspired with
the fanatical conviction that they are in possession of the only gospel
which will redeem this sad Planet and bring on a Golden Age. If so,
we need not consider how far that would justify the endless stratagems to
which they resorted; and it is not for us to say whether such a prosecu-
tion makes against the movement, or, on the contrary, only creates more
disciples; ours is only to apply the law as we find it .... We know no
country where they would have been allowed any approach to the license
here accorded them; and none, except Great Britain, where they would
have had so fair a hearing. Their only plausible complaint is that that
freedom of speech which they would be the first to destroy has been
denied them. We acknowledge that freedom is not always easy to protect;
and that there is no sharp line that marks its scope. We have tried to
show that what these men taught and advocated is outside the zone.8 4
This decision has not been greeted by the publicists with the same
enthusiasm with which other of his opinions have been received.
Even Irving Dilliard, who has compiled and edited some of Judge-
Hand's non-legal papers and who is an ardent admirer of the man
and his contributions to American life, expressed disapproval of the
opinion.85 John Wasnick, writing on recent cases in the Catholic Uni-
versity of America Law Review, thought that:
82. 252 U.S. 239, 254 (1920).
83. Although Judge Hand denied the defendant's challenge to the array,
since that question does not involve free speech issues it has not been
analyzed.
84. 183 F.2d at 234.
85. HAND, THE SPIRIT oF LIBERTY xvii (Dilliard ed. 1952).
32319571
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
Judge Hand, in the Dennis case, has extended the doctrine of clear and
present danger to include clear and probable danger where the overthrow
of the government by force is more than an obscure possibility ...
There are, therefore, two tests which Judge Hand could have applied-
the clear and present danger test, and the bad tendency test. He has
chosen to apply neither, but has instead created a new test, the test of
clear and probable danger. Apparently he found it impossible to find
a clear and present danger, for had he so found, it would have been
unnecessary to create this new doctrine.
86
Stanley Levine in a note in the Rutger's Law Review saw
.. . the introduction into the legal philosophy of doctrines governing
regulation of civil liberties of a possible middle ground between the
doctrine represented by Schenck v. United States, and Gitlow v. New
York-but one which can very easily become a no-man's land which
will draw the clear and present danger test into its quicksand.87
A note in the University of Pennsylvania Law Review expressed the
opinion:
In the instant case Judge Learned Hand decided not to follow the Gitlow
case, but claimed to follow Holmes' doctrine, while still finding that the
advocacy of the defendants did constitute a "clear and present danger."
Although Judge Hand applied the test, he altered its classic meaning.
The decision would permit suppression of words which created a high
probability of danger in the future, although they did not present an
imminent threat.... Though it lends itself to easier application, there is
a possibility that the test will be too broadly applied in later cases .... 88
Perhaps the most violent attack has come from Mr. Louis Boudin.89
Mr. Boudin's chief objection was that Judge Hand had "definitely
and irrevocably" 90 emasculated the Holmes-Brandeis rule "of any
meaningful content."9' 1 He accused Judge Hand of following a tortuous
course of reasoning in his review of precedents that resulted in the
clear and present danger test's becoming under his treatment a thing
of threads and patches. He quarrelled with the resort to history to
show the probability of danger resulting from the conspiracy charged
in the indictment and proceeded to expound his own view of history,
fortified by references to two books, in an attempt to show that Hand
was a poor historian. He especially objected to what he termed Hand's
"labored"92 reasoning that the presence or absence of a "clear and
present danger" was a question to be decided by the judge. Mr.
Boudin argued that the court should have interpreted the statute un-
86. 1 CATHOLIC U.L. REV. 103-04 (1951).
87. Levine, The Clear and/or Present Danger Doctrine: A New Equation, 5
RUTGERS L. REV. 413, 419 (1951).
88. 99 U. PA. L. REV. 407, 408-09 (1950).
89. Boldin, "Seditious Doctrines" and the "Clear and Present Danger"
Rule, 38 VA. L. REV. 143-86, 315-56 (1952).
90. Id. at 329.
91. Ibid.
92. Id. at 330.
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der the first amendment to require a showing of "clear and present
danger," if it wished to apply that rule; and then permitted the jury to
decide the fact of the degree of its imminency. He reinforced his
argument on this point by citing the Pierce case, the Whitney case, and
finally the Schaefer case where Justice Brandeis had said:
The question whether, in a particular instance the words spoken or
written fall within the permissible curtailment of free speech is, under
the rule enunciated by this court, one of degree. And because it is a
question of degree the field in which the jury may exercise its judgment
is, necessarily, a wide one. But its field is not unlimited. The trial
provided for is one by judge and jury; and the judge may not abdicate his
function. If the words were of such a nature and were used under such
circumstances that men, judging in calmness, could not reasonably say
that they created a clear and present danger that they would bring
about the evil which Congress sought and had a right to prevent, then
it is the duty of the trial judge to withdraw the case from the considera-
tion of the jury; and if he fails to do so, it is the duty of the appellate
court to correct the error.93
These criticisms of Mr. Boudin are direct and of a serious nature,
but they are answered by Judge Hand in his opinion. It is true that
the matter of conclusions to be drawn from recent history are
usually open to question, but it is also highly improbable that many
qualified historians would feel disposed to question the facts upon
which the Hand conclusions were based.
The several criticisms which have been offered all seem to boil
down to the general charge that Judge Hand altered the "cIear and
present danger" rule to mean a grave danger of entertainable proba-
bility, and that in so doing he erred in his interpretation and performed
a neat feat of judicial emasculation. Although it is apparent that he
viewed with some distaste the veneration accorded a mere formula and
one so imprecise and that he distrusted the labored stuffing of judicial
reasoning into moulds of any kind to the exclusion of a consideration
of the values which formed them,94 yet it can scarcely be charged with
validity that he deviated materially from the Holmes-Brandeis phi-
losophy of free speech or that he neglected to consider the social
values which their philosophy sought to protect and conserve. Justice
Holmes himself wrote the opinions in the Schenck case,9 5 the Froh-
werk9 case, and the Debs97 case in all of which he sustained convictions
93. Id. at 353.
94. See Hand's opinion in International Brotherhood of Electrical Engineers,
Local 501 v. NLRB, 181 F.2d 34 (2d Cir. 1950).
95. 249 U.S. 47 (1919).
96. 249 U.S. 204 (1919).
97. 49 U.S. 211 (1919). In an early case, Commonwealth v. Kennedy, 170
Mass. 18, 20 (1897), Holmes spoke of the "substantive evil," and said the act
must come pretty near to accomplishing that result before the law will notice
it. After he was elevated to the supreme bench, he spoke of "dangerous proba-
bility" in Swift & Co. v. United States, 196 U.S. 375, 396 (1905), and again of
"dangerous proximity," in Hyde v. United States, 225 U.S. 347, 388 (1912).
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under the Espionage Act of 1917. In the latter case he clearly equated
"imminency" with "probability." In that case in discussing the rela-
tionship between the words used by Eugene Debs and the danger they
carried to the war effort he said:
If that was intended [obstruction of recruiting] and if, in all the cir-
cumstances that would be its probable effect, it would not be protected by
reason of its being part of a general program and the expressions of
a general and conscientious belief.98 (Emphasis added.)
Although it is true that Judge Hand did not cite this case to buttress
his conviction that "imminency" must be equated with "probability,"
it is significant that under the circumstances of the case before him
he arrived at the same conclusion.
What Judge Hand did was to review the pertinent cases. From his
reading he saw that there had been little agreement in the Supreme
Court as to what the hallowed phrase meant or as to how it should
be applied. Reasoning within the frame-work of the cases as they ap-
peared in the record, he concluded that the danger to be averted by
a repression of free speech under the First Amendment must be grave
and probable. And even though the reasonable foundation of the
doctrine rested upon a faith that, given time, free speech would re-
veal the falsity of pernicious doctrines, nevertheless, that faith it-
self grew out of another faith-that the rules of the market place
would be observed by those who there purveyed their intellectual
-wares. It did not follow that Holmes and Brandeis would have pro-
.tected a conspiracy of men who sought the protection of free speech
-only to destroy it, who worked to undermine the market place for
the free exchange of ideas by subterraneous borings and secret
sapping.
It is possible that Judge Hand would have employed the more ob-
jective test of incitement which he had devised in the Masses case if
he had felt himself free so to do, but the Roosevelt Court by expand-
ing and glorifying the "clear and present danger" test made it incum-
bent upon him as a lower court judge to apply it. In so doing he
found the danger to free institutions from communist subversion
grave. In choosing between the advantages flowing from an un-
xestricted exercise of free speech and those inhering in the duty of
a free state to protect itself by a law agreed upon by the representa-
tives of the people of the free state he chose the latter.
Justices Holmes and Brandeis were never confronted by a free
-speech decision in so grave a social context. They did not live to see
the sad events of the past decade, nor the world threatened by the
-materialistic doctrine of men who, intent upon world revolution, move
by stealth and strike with scientific violence to achieve their ends.
98. 249 U.S. 215 (1919).
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Finally, it is doubtful that they ever thought of the "clear and present
danger" tests as anything more than the statement of a broad and
general principle useful as a judicial tool.
John A. Gorfinkle and Julian W. Mack II, writing in the California
Law Review,9 see the rule as merely the statement of a broad prin-
ciple and support this thesis by quotations from the opinions of Holmes
and Brandeis. They show that these two justices regarded the famous
phrase as a rule of reason to be applied by the court and only then by
the exercise of good judgment. They quote Justice Brandeis as saying,
in Whitney v. California:
This Court has not yet fixed the standard by which to determine when a
danger shall be deemed clear; how remote the danger may be and yet be
deemed present; and what degree of evil shall be deemed sufficiently sub-
stantial to justify resort to abridgment of free speech and assembly
as the means of protection.100
The Hand opinion in the Dennis case does no injury to such views;
rather it serves to reinforce them.
On June 4, 1951, the Supreme Court of the United States, having
granted certiorari limited to the questions of whether the Smith
Act violated the first amendment as construed and applied by the
lower court, and as to whether it violated as applied the first and the
fifth amendments because of indefiniteness, upheld Judge Hand
in a majority opinion written by Mr. Chief Justice Vinson. Justices
Burton, Reed, and Minton joined in the opinion; Justices Jackson and
Frankfurter wrote separate concurring opinions; Justices Black and
Douglas dissented in separate opinions; Mr. Justice Clark did not
participate in the decision.
The Chief Justice accepted throughout the opinion of the court of
appeals. The opinion adopted Judge Hand's definition of the mean-
ing of the "clear and present danger" rule by saying:
Chief-Judge Learned Hand, writing for the majority below, interpreted
the phrase as follows: "In each case [courts] must ask whether the gravity
of the 'evil,' discounted by its improbability, justifies such invasion
of free speech as is necessary to avoid the danger." We adopt this state-
ment of the rule. As articulated by Chief Judge Hand, it is as succinct
and inclusive as any other we might devise at this time. It takes into
consideration those factors which we deem relevant, and relates their
significances. More we can not expect from words.101
Mr. Justice Frankfurter in a separate concurring opinion ap-
proached the problem from another viewpoint. The theory behind
his opinion is that great questions of public policy should. be de-
99. Gorfinkle and Mack, Dennis v. United States and the Clear and Present
Danger Rule, 39 CALIF. L. REV. 475, 479 (1951).
100. 274 U.S. 357, 374 (1927).
101. Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 510 (1951).
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cided by representatives of the people in legislatures assembled for
that purpose. "To make the validity of legislation depend on judicial
reading of events still in the womb of time... is to charge the judiciary
with duties beyond its equipment."'10 2 The court, he was convinced,
should not set aside legislation unless it was palpably unreasonable
and oppressive.103 Justice Frankfurter very, very gently reprimanded
Judge Hand for his interpretation of the "clear and present danger"
doctrine by saying:
In all fairness, the argument cannot be met by reinterpreting the Court's
frequent use of "clear" and "present" to mean an entertainable "proba-
bility." In giving this meaning to the phrase "clear and present danger"
the Court of Appeals was fastidiously confining the rhetoric of opinions
to the exact scope of what was decided by them. We have greater re-
sponsibility for having given constitutional support over repeated pro-
tests, to uncritical libertarian generalities. 104
It is to be observed that Justice Frankfurter agreed with Judge
Hand that the hackneyed phrase was "imprecise." That the two
jurists were at one on the values protected by the first amendment
is evidenced by the fact that Justice Frankfurter quoted with ap-
proval Learned Hand's words on this subject in the case, International
Electrical Workers, Local 501 v. NLRB. 0 5
Mr. Justice Jackson presented another theory of the case. He
would -save the "clear and present danger" test for application in
the kind of cases for which it was devised-when the issue is the
criminality of a hot-headed speech on a street corner or circulation
of a few incendiary pamphlets .. ."106 Where the case requires pre-
diction and prophecy of the effects of a well organized, nation-wide
conspiracy he would apply the law of conspiracy and common law
incitement. He felt that the power to prohibit such conspiracies was
within the constitutional power of Congress. If one should counsel
and encourage violation of the law, he must be punished. In this
connection Justice Jackson quoted the decision of Judge Hand in the
Masses case:
One may not counsel or advise others to violate the law as it stands.
Words are not only the keys of persuasion, but the triggers of action,
and those which have no purport but to counsel the violation of law can
not by any latitude of interpretation be a part of that public opinion which
is the final source of government in a democracy.107
Here again is the old rule pronounced by Judge Hand in 1917. Here
is a reiteration of the theme that runs through all of Judge Hand's
102. Id. at 551.
103. Id. at 525.
104. Id. at 527.
105. See quoted text and note 45 supra.
106. 341 U.S. at 568.
107. Quoted by Justice Jackson. Id. at 571.
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opinions in free speech cases. Learned Hand must have read this
opinion with approval for it was an echo out of his own mouth. As a
matter of fact every single justice on the majority side quoted from
Judge Hand's free speech opinions, and each quoted from a different
case.108 This evidences the influence of Learned Hand in this field.
The dissenting opinions by Justices Black and Douglas repudiated
the Hand-Vinson views. Justice Black charged that the "clear and pres-
ent danger" doctrine had been undermined; that the law as written was
an unconstitutional invasion of constitutional freedom because it was
directed at teaching and advocacy. He expressed his often asserted
belief that the first amendment enjoys a preferred position, and
statutes written under its mandate should not be sustained merely
because the court thinks them to be reasonable under the circum-
stances. 0 9 To Justice Douglas the evidence fell short of proving
seditious conduct. Speech short of incitement to immediate unlaw-
ful conduct he believed to be protected. Provocateurs should be
silenced only when they moved from speech to action.110
That Judge Hand's decision in the Dennis case did weaken the
"clear and present danger" rule as that rule was understood by liber-
tarian publicists and those who had adopted the "double standard"
of constitutional interpretation cannot be doubted. That it embraced,
however, and expressed the rationale, the underlying values to which
that formula pointed equally cannot be doubted. Certainly he rendered
a service by pointing out that shibboleth and formulas offer scant pro-
tection for anything valuable in society, being merely tools, judicial
compasses for making clear the direction to be taken. Unfortunately
men pin their faith to such phrases and become angry and sometimes
vituperative when they feel them slighted or disregarded. To this
point Judge Hand might have quoted Carlyle, who once wrote:
What can be more unprofitable than to stretch out the old formula and
law phraseology, so that it may cover the new, contradictory, entirely
uncoverable Thing! Whereby the poor Formula does but crack, and one's
honesty along with it! The thing that is palpably hot, burning, wilt thou
prove it, by syllogism, to be a freezing mixture? This stretching out of
Formulas till they crack is, especially in times of swift change, one of
the sorrowfulest tasks poor Humanity has.111
Paul A. Freund has expressed Learned Hand's reaction to the "clear
and present danger" doctrine to a nicety and in words that re-echo
the Judge's own phrases:
108. Id. at 510, 550, 571.
109. Id. at 579-80.
110. Id. at 590-91.
111. Quoted in Wigmore, Abrams v. United States: Freedom of Speech and




The truth is that the clear-and-present-danger test is an oversimplified
judgment unless it takes account also of a number of other factors: the
relative seriousness of the danger in comparison with the value of the
occasion for speech or political activity; the availability of more moderate
controls than those which the state has imposed; and perhaps the spe-
cific intent with which the speech or activity is launched. No matter
how rapidly we utter the phrase, "clear and present danger," or how
closely we hyphenate the words, they are not a substitute for the weigh-
ing of values. They tend to convey a delusion of certitude when what
is most certain is the complexity of the strands in the web of freedoms
which the judge must disentangle.112
THE DOUBLE STANDARD
There remains yet another facet of Learned Hand's exposition of
freedom of speech and press, which, though more pertinent to his
concept of the limits of judicial discretion, deserves consideration
because it impinges upon the relative value of freedom of expression.
Judge Hand does not belong to that school of constitutional interpre-
tation that expounds the gospel of the "double standard"-that is, that
the Bill of Rights offers a wide latitude for those who tinker with the
institution of property but a much narrower margin to those who
would limit what have been called civil rights. To Judge Hand the
generalized statement, making up the Bill of Rights are not law in
the strict sense of that term but rather a summing up of historical ex-
perience, counsels of moderation, admonitions to forbearance "di-
rected against the spirit of faction when factions sought to press politi-
cal advantage to ruthless extremes. 11 3 There are no eternal and
immutable verities. Each generation must pour into the moulds the
amalgam of its own experience; each generation must be permitted
freedom to solve the vexing political problems occasioned by its own
development. Under the American system, law is enacted by the
public assemblies of representatives of the people. There competing
interests must compromise their strife, and a court has no more right
to invalidate that compromise when freedom of expression is the
subject of law than when the interests of property are affected by
legislation.
Judge Hand made this clear in an address delivered at a commemo-
ration meeting of the New York City Bar Association for Chief
Justice Stone." 4 In that speech he called for judicial consistency in
viewing the personal interest in property as at least the equivalent
of the personal interest in freedom of expression. He realized that
one of the most powerful currents in the national tradition was and is
112. FREUND, ON UNDERSTANDING THE SUPREME COURT 27-28 (1949) .
113. Hand, Chief Justice Stone's Conception of the Judicial Function, 46
COLUM. L. Rxv. 696-97 (1946).
114. Id. at 697.
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concern for the social value inhering in the ownership of property.
This speech revealed again the clarity and balance of Judge Learned
Hand's mind. What he was insisting upon was that judges should
balance against each other values of the same categories or kinds;
when they applied a standard they should apply it consistently. The
same standard that determined the constitutionality of legislation re-
specting property should determine the constitutionality of legisla-
tion respecting free speech, or religious freedom, or freedom of as-
sembly; for all of these are personal rights; they are all necessary
attributes for the development of the maximum human potential.
By implication Judge Hand revealed the basic anomaly in the posi-
tion of those liberals who welcome each legislative refashioning of
the institution of property and howl with anguish when the representa-
tives of the people dare limit in any way "civil rights."
Paul A. Freund thinks that:
The most impressive challenge to the double standard has come from
Judge Learned Hand.... Judge Hand has contributed to the clarity of
analysis by reminding us that the relevant comparison is not between
the enduring values of free inquiry and expression on the one hand,
and transitory measures for the control of property on the other; the
problem is harder than that. We are obliged to compare the ultimate
values of property with those of free inquiry and expression, or to
compare the legislative compromises in the two realms; for laws dealing
with libel or sedition or sound trucks, or a non-political civil service are
as truly adjustments and accommodations as are laws fixing prices or
making grants of monopolies."15
115. Freund, op. cit. supra note 112, at 12-14. Compare Judge Hand's own
statement in United States v. Dennis, 183 F.2d 201, 212, and his statement in
NLRB v. Federbush, 121 F.2d 954 (2d Cir. 1914).
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